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Abstract
In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simul-
taneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players.
The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative understanding of outcomes of such sequential
auctions. In earlier work (Paes Leme et al. 2012) we initiated the study of the price of anarchy in
sequential auctions. We considered sequential first price auctions in the full information model,
where players are aware of all future opportunities, as well as the valuation of all players. In
this paper, we study efficiency in sequential auctions in the Bayesian environment, relaxing the
informational assumption on the players. We focus on two environments, both studied in the
full information model in Paes Leme et al. 2012, matching markets and matroid auctions. In the
full information environment, a sequential first price cut auction for matroid settings is efficient.
In Bayesian environments this is no longer the case, as we show using a simple example with
three players. Our main result is a bound of 1 + e
e−1
≈ 2.58 on the price of anarchy in both
matroid auctions and single-value matching markets (even with correlated types) and a bound
of 2 e
e−1
≈ 3.16 for general matching markets with independent types. To bound the price of
anarchy we need to consider possible deviations at an equilibrium. In a sequential Bayesian
environment the effect of deviations is more complex than in one-shot games; early bids allow
others to infer information about the player’s value. We create effective deviations despite the
presence of this difficulty by introducing a bluffing technique of independent interest.
1 Introduction
Auctions typically used in practice are extremely simple, not truthful, and do not even run simulta-
neously. The Web provides an environment where running auctions becomes easy, an environment
where simplicity of design and decreased need of coordination is more important than ever before.
The most well-known auction design is the truthful and efficient VCG auction, which requires
large amount of coordination among sellers, having items available simultaneously, and requires the
sellers to agree on how to divide the revenue. The classical field of mechanism design has a long and
distinguished history. However, the mechanisms proposed are typically too complex, and require
careful coordination between the sellers. Mechanism design for either multidimensional valuations
or players with correlated types is proving to be rather challenging and leads to quite complicated
mechanisms. In contrast, mechanisms typically used in practice tend to be simple, and do not
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satisfy the high standards of classical mechanism design even in simple environments. Bidders
appear to prefer simple mechanisms. Given the prevalent use of simple mechanisms, it is important
to design simple auctions with good performance and to understand properties of auction designs
used in practice.
Several recent papers have studied properties of simple item-bidding auctions, such as using
simultaneous second price auctions for each item [7, 3], or simultaneous first price auctions [11, 12]
and show that equilibria of these games have high social welfare. Other recent papers study simple
auctions used in practice and show that high social welfare can be achieved even when players’
valuations come from arbitrarily correlated distributions [16, 5].
In this paper we will focus on sequential auctions. The simplest, most natural and most common
way to auction items by different owners is to run individual single item auctions (e.g. sell each
item separately on eBay). In [21] we initiated the study of the quality of outcomes in sequential
auctions in the full information setting. Full information is an extremely strong assumption: buyers
have to be aware of all future opportunities, and the valuations of all bidders participating in future
auctions. In contrast, in online auctions (see [22] for a survey) it is assumed that players make
strategic decisions without having any information about the future. However, typical participants
in auctions have some information about future events, and engage in strategic thinking about the
upcoming auctions. The Bayesian environment considered in this paper allows us to model agents
who are fully strategic, and have partial information about upcoming auctions. We focus on first
price auctions as the price of anarchy for second price auctions can be arbitrarily bad in most
environments already in the full information setting, including matching markets or even additive
valuations.
The goal of this paper is to study sequential first price auctions in the Bayesian setting, relaxing
the full information assumption of [21]. Many of the results for simultaneous auctions, such as [7, 3],
extend naturally, and sometimes without degradation of quality, to the Bayesian setting. However,
such extension is more difficult in the sequential setting. To bound the price of anarchy we need to
consider possible deviations at an equilibrium. The sequential and Bayesian environment presents
additional difficulties that we need to overcome. Early bids allow others to infer information about
the player’s value, causing the player behavior in later auctions to become correlated even when
valuations are drawn independently, and correlated bidding makes it harder to prove price of anarchy
bounds - indicative of this is that Bayes-Nash price of anarchy proofs for simultaneous item bidding
(e.g.[3, 11]) would fail in the presence of correlated bidding.
Another difficulty that is more technical is that price of anarchy proofs typically consider possible
deviations that the players have. However, in a sequential setting it is unclear how to predict player
behavior outside the equilibrium path. To deal with this issue in [21] we consider deviations where
players remain on the equilibrium path until a particular item of interest arrives, the item assigned
to them in the efficient allocation. In the Bayesian setting, it is harder to identify what can be such
an item of interest, as the efficient solution varies with the valuations of other players. We use a
random draw of the valuation to select the item in question, and introduce a bluffing technique to
de-correlate the behavior of players and relate the equilibrium outcome to the efficient solution in
expectation.
We model strategic thinking in a sequential Bayesian environment by using the notion of Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium models players updating their beliefs about the
values of other participants throughout the game based on the information inferred from previous
auctions. This update of beliefs is greatly affected by the information structure of the game. It
depends on what information is available to participants after each round of the auction. Updates
are needed even if players only observe their own outcomes. The main technical problem with
Bayesian sequential games is that the Bayesian update of beliefs is well defined only when players
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observe actions that are employed by some players type at equilibrium. Otherwise, the probability of
observing such an action is zero and an update is not well defined. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
assumes that for such out of equilibrium histories of play, players can form any possible belief that is
consistent with the history. A more restrictive notion is that of the Sequential Equilibrium, where
each player uses a perturbed strategy, bidding uniformly at random with a small probability ǫ.
Such perturbation makes all bids possible on the equilibrium path, and hence an equilibrium has
well-defined beliefs for each possible history of play. A sequential equilibrium is the limit of such
ǫ-perturbed equilibria as ǫ goes to 0. Our example of a matching auction shows that the outcome
is inefficient even at a sequential equilibrium, but our bounds on the price of anarchy make no
assumptions on the players’ beliefs outside the equilibrium path. Hence, our upper bounds also
hold for the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
The updates of beliefs depend on what information is available to the players after each round.
Updates are needed even if players only observe their own outcomes, but releasing more information
to the players allows for more informative updates. In our result on matroid auctions we assume that
the winner (and possibly the winning price) is public information after each round. In particular,
players deviations from equilibrium are not observed by other players, as long as they do not effect
the outcome. Our result on matching auctions does not require any assumption on the information
structure.
To illustrate the issues discussed above we start in Section 2 by giving an example of a two-round
sequential first price auction in the Bayesian setting. The example has two items on sale, and three
bidders. Bidders 1 and 2 are interested in acquiring either of the two items and have equal value
for them, while the 3rd bidder wants only the second item. In the full information setting, the
only subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is to allocate the two items to the two bidders of
larger value. We consider this game with valuations drawn from [0, 1] uniformly at random. Note
that in the 2nd auction the third bidder has an information advantage. In this auction two bidders
compete for the second item, the newly arrived bidder, and the bidder who lost the first auction.
The advantage comes from the fact that losing the first auction contains information about the
valuation of this bidder. This information asymmetry, and the fact that first price auction is not
truthful, naturally leads to inefficiency. While this example is stated as a matching market, the
same example with 3 bidders can also be thought of as matroid auction, as we will show in Section
4.
1.1 Our Results
In section 3 we consider matching markets, where player i has valuation vij for item j, and is
interested in acquiring only one item. We will assume that there is free disposal, so his value for a
set of items J is maxj∈J vij . We assume that the valuations of different players are independent,
and the valuation of player i comes from a distribution Fi. Note that the valuation of different
items for the same player can be arbitrarily correlated, for example, players can have the same
value for each item of interest. We prove a bound of 2 e
e−1 ≈ 3.16 on the price of anarchy of this
game. This is an improvement even in the full information case, where in [21] we showed a bound
of 4 for the price of anarchy of mixed Nash equilibria for the full information version. However,
it is still a bit larger than the bound of 2 for the case of pure equilibria in the full information
case. It is an interesting open problem if this increase is necessary. Our proof for pure equilibria
in the full information setting relies on evaluating deviating bids for each player on the item they
are assigned in the efficient outcome. This simple deviation strategy doesn’t work in the Bayesian
setting, as the efficient outcome depends on all the players’ valuations. Our technique of selecting
a good deviation to consider leads to a small increase in the bound. The result also extends to
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versions of the problem where items are not auctioned one-by-one, but rather groups of items are
auctioned simultaneously in each sequential step.
In section 4 we consider a sequential matroid auction. The matroid structure limits the possible
set of people that can get served to be a basis of that matroid. We assume that the players’
valuations are drawn from a joint distribution F , that can be arbitrarily correlated. In each step
of the auction, we run a first price auction for selecting an element of a cut that doesn’t contain a
previous winner. This auction structure corresponds to the standard greedy algorithm for selecting
the basis of maximum value. In [21] we showed that in the full information setting, this auction
implements the Vcg outcome (achieves the same allocation and prices). In contrast, as the example
mentioned above shows, the Bayesian information structure leads to inefficiency. We show that the
resulting inefficiency is not unlimited by giving a bound of 1 + e
e−1 on the price of anarchy. An
interesting example of the matroid auction is matchable subsets of a bipartite graph (a set of nodes
in one side is independent, if there is a way to match them to the other side via a matching in the
graph). We can think of this as a special case of the matching auction, when players have a single
private value vi but each can only be assigned to a subset of items Si. For such a matroid setting a
more natural auction is to run the sequential item auction that we studied in the matching markets
case, instead of the sequential cut auction. We show that the sequential item auction for this special
case of matching markets has price of anarchy at most 1 + e
e−1 even when bidders valuations are
correlated.
1.2 Related Work
The study of Sequential Auctions in the economics literature was initiated by the works of [24]
and [19] that analyzed first and second price sequential auctions with unit-demand bidders in the
incomplete information model. They considered a setting where items are identical and players have
the same value for all the items available which is drawn independently from the same distribution.
Moreover, they limit their study to symmetric equilibria which, in their setting, are always efficient.
Much of the literature of sequential auctions used the Milgrom and Weber model to study sequential
auctions [1, 18]. Little is known for more complex valuation models in the incomplete information
case (see e.g. [15] for a detailed exposition on results in sequential first price auctions), mainly
due to the fact that for more complex valuation models or for asymmetric or correlated settings
computing the equilibrium analytically is hard. However, our price of anarchy techniques allow us
to expose meaningful properties for much more complex environments without the need to explicitly
calculate the equilibrium strategies.
A few papers consider the complete information case for more complex settings. For example,
[9, 23, 2] study models of multi-unit demands but only for the case of two bidders. Most of this
work depends heavily on having just two bidders since then the subgame perfect equilibrium that
survives elimination of weakly dominated strategies is unique. In [21] we initiated the study of the
price of anarchy in sequential auctions with multi-unit demands and more than two bidders. In this
work we manage to give efficiency guarantees for sequential auctions not only among more than
two bidders but also in the incomplete information case, even for asymmetric players and in some
cases even for correlated bidders.
Recent work from the Algorithmic Game Theory community studied the outcomes of simple
mechanisms for multi-item auctions. Christodoulou, Kovacs and Schapira [7] and [3] study the case
of running simultaneous second price item auctions for combinatorial auction settings. [7] prove
that for bidders with submodular valuations and incomplete information, the Bayes-Nash Price of
Anarchy is 2. [3] study the more general case of bidders with subadditive valuations and show that
under complete information, the Price of Anarchy of any Pure Nash Equilibrium is 2 and under
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Figure 1: The left figure shows the symmetric equilibrium bidding function of the first stage auction
compared to myopic bidding b(v) = v/2. The right figure shows the asymmetric bidding equilibrium
of the second stage auction when player b wins the first auction and hence players a, c compete in
the second auction. The value of player b is thus revealed and the belief on player a is updated to
be uniform on [0, vb].
incomplete information the Price of Anarchy of any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is at most logarithmic
in the number of items. [11] and [12] study the case of simultaneous first price auctions and show
that the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game correspond to exactly the Walrasian equilibria. [11]
also show that mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria have a price of anarchy of 2 for submodular bidders
and logarithmic, in the number of items, for subadditive valuations.
The most recent related work on Matroid Auctions is that of [4] who propose a centralized
ascending auction for selling a base of a Matroid that results in the Vcg outcome. We study a
sequential version of this matroid base auction which potentially renders the auction more dis-
tributed. Several other recent works have focused on mechanism design questions in the case when
the feasible set of allocations has a matroid structure [6, 10].
2 An Illustrative Example and Preliminaries
We start our discussion with a simple illustrative example. Assume two items will be available for
auction. First item 1 and then item 2. There are three buyers a, b, c. Two of the buyers a and b
would like either of the two items, while bidder c is only interested in the second item. Suppose
that all players valuations are drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 1) (and players a and b
value either item the same). The following theorem, whose proof we defer to Appendix A describes
the Sequential Equilibrium bidding strategy of the first stage auction of this game.
Theorem 2.1 There is a sequential equilibrium of this game, where in the first auction, players a
and b bid using the bidding function b(v) = 1− ln(1+v)
v
, and the players’ beliefs about a player losing
to a bid b(v) is that the losing player has valuation uniformly distributed in the range [0, v].
Observe that players bid more conservatively in the first auction than in the standard first price
auction without accounting for their expected utility from the second auction. In Figure 1 we
show the equilibrium bidding function of the first auction as compared to the (myopic) equilibrium
bidding function of b(v) = v/2 not taking into account the second round.
Our main point for presenting this example is not the particular form of the equilibrium, but
rather the fact that it leads to an asymmetric auction in the second stage. Equilibria in such asym-
metric auctions can be computed analytically (see e.g. [15]) and it is well known that asymmetric
first price auctions lead to inefficient outcomes, i.e. there are regions of players values where the
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player with the smaller valuation wins. In contrast, in a full information game this simple auction
has a unique equilibrium, that is socially optimal.
Corollary 2.2 The above equilibrium is not guaranteed to be efficient.
The loss of efficiency comes from a factor that is necessarily introduced by our incomplete
information setting: Asymmetry. Even if players start with symmetric priors, and even if we keep
the prices secret, the fact that players participate in different auctions causes asymmetry. Suppose
that players started with a symmetric prior distribution F . Then in the second auction the loser of
the first auction has a distribution that is F conditional on his value being smaller than the winner
of the first auction. It is well-known that in such asymmetric settings the player with the weaker
distribution is more aggressive ([17, 13, 14]), which leads to inefficiency.
Next we formally define an equilibrium of a sequential game. In the example above, it is natural
to assume that when player a loses to a bid w, and the bidders employ a monotone bidding strategy
b(x) at equilibrium, then the common belief on player a’s valuation is updated to condition a’s
distribution on va ≤ b−1(w), since he must have bid less than w if he lost. This is the natural
Bayesian update of the information about the value, given that the players observed a losing the
first auction. Note, however that in the equilibrium claimed above the range of bids in the first
auction is [0, 1−ln 2]. To complete the definition of an equilibrium, we also have to define how beliefs
are updated if players bid outside the range of the equilibrium, i.e. if they go off the equilibrium
path.
2.1 Extensive-form Games of Incomplete Information
Defining an equilibrium in a sequential (or extensive form) game is more complex than in the full
information setting. In a full information game the subgame perfect equilibrium is defined naturally
via backwards induction. In each stage the player’s strategies need to form an equilibrium, given
the expected outcome defined in future games. In a Bayesian game we need to not only describe
the strategies of the players, but also define how beliefs about player values are updated given the
information available at each stage, and these strategies and belief updates need to be consistent.
A Bayesian extensive form game is defined in our setting as follows (see [8] for a more
comprehensive treatment). At any point in the game, player’s information correspond to pairs
(vi, ha) of the player’s valuation (vector) vi and the history ha of outcomes in auctions before
auction a. In the games we consider, we will assume that the same information is available to all
players, hence the information depends only on the stage of the auction, which simplifies notation.
A strategy of a player is a bid for each information set. Thus a player’s strategy consists of bids
bi(vi, ha).
We can model a sequential game via a game tree, where the starting nodes correspond to different
possible valuation profiles, and later nodes correspond to such valuation and a history of play so
far. However, players can only base their updates on information available to them, so a player’s
information set consists of nodes for each possible valuation of the rest of the players v−i. Player i
doesn’t have deterministic information as to which of these nodes is implemented, since the same
history of play ha could be implemented with different valuation profiles. However, the history
of play signals incomplete information about the probability distribution of valuations. This is
captured by the belief system of the sequential equilibrium. Specifically in a sequential equilibrium a
player has to have beliefs over the nodes of an information set that are consistent with the strategies.
This forward consistency is what creates the complexity of the incomplete information setting that
we will briefly describe. Given the beliefs of the players at an information set, his bid has to
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maximize his expected utility. Moreover, the belief of a player at an information set is the Bayesian
update of his initial beliefs given the history of play.
An additional difficulty arises when we consider examples, such as the three bidder example
above, when the proposed bidding strategy has limited range. In order to fully describe an equi-
librium, we need to also define how beliefs will be updated if players deviate by bidding above the
range, or more generally use strategies that are not on an equilibrium path for some instance of the
players valuations. For histories that have zero density in equilibrium, Bayesian update is not well
defined. However, we need to define how beliefs will be updated to be able to evaluate if players
would benefit from deviating to such strategies.
The notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium allows for almost any updates in this case, as
long as the system of beliefs is consistent with prior and the history. The Sequential Equilibrium,
is a more refined notion. In this equilibrium the beliefs on the information sets that are never reached
by some equilibrium path have to be limits of Bayesian updates for ǫ-perturbed strategies of the
rest of the players, i.e. if the players were playing every strategy with at least some ǫ density, then
the Bayesian update of the beliefs is well-defined for all information sets. Then for a belief to be
consistent with a sequential equilibrium it has to be the limit of the beliefs of some sequence of
such ǫ strategies.
Sequential Equilibrium has been mostly used in games with finite action and type spaces. One
can think of a discretized version of our auction games, where types and bids are multiples of some ǫ
and then take ǫ to zero. This is very natural in auction settings since, both types and valuations are
multiples of pennies. However, we could also use a recent formal definition of Sequential Equilibrium
for infinite type and action space games proposed by Myerson and Reny [20]. Our efficiency results
are very robust and extend to all these different type of equilibrium definitions.
2.2 Efficiency in Auction Games
The core property satisfied by the above solution concepts that will be needed to prove the efficiency
guarantees is that a player’s expected utility conditional on his value is maximized at equilibrium.
Specifically, consider the normal form representation of the extensive form game defined by our
auction game. A strategy of a player i in this normal form representation is a function bi(ti) that
takes a player’s type t as input and outputs a whole contingency plan on what a player will bid at
each auction for each possible history of play. If a strategy profile b(t) = (bi(ti))i∈N constitutes an
equilibrium then it must satisfy that for any player i and type ti:
ui(ti) = Et−i [ui(b(t)] ≥ Et−i [ui(b′i, b−i(t−i)] (1)
In other words we need only that the equilibrium is a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the normal
form representation of our extensive form games. The Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibrium
concepts introduce further refinements on how the beliefs of the players should be updated according
to the history of play observed and how the players behave when some non-equilibrium history is
observed.
The social welfare SW (b) of a bid profile b in our auction games is the sum of the utilities of
the players and the auctioneer, which boils down to the total value of the players from the resulting
allocation. Given a type profile t, we denote with Opt(t) the allocation that maximizes social
welfare.
We quantify the inefficiency of an equilibrium using the concept of the Bayes-Nash Price of
Anarchy which is the fraction of the expected social welfare at the worst equilibrium concept that
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satisfies the above condition over the expected optimal social welfare.
Bayes-PoA = sup
b(·) is BNE
Et[Opt(t)]
Et[SW (b(t)]
(2)
3 Sequential Auctions for Matching Markets
In this section we consider the first example of a sequential auction. There are a set of m items on
sale, each with a different seller. Items can go on sale simultaneously in groups, or individually. We
assume that buyers are unit-demand, we use vij to denote player i’s value for item j and assume
the value of player i for a set S of items is his maximum value item in the set: vi(S) = maxi∈S vij
(i.e. we assume free disposal). We will use vi ∈ R[m] to denote the vector of valuations of buyer i.
We study such markets in incomplete information setting. We assume that each player’s valuation
vector is drawn independently from some prior distribution Fi that is common knowledge. Note
that a single user’s valuations can be arbitrarily correlated, we only assume independence between
the different buyers.
3.1 Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy
In this section we prove that there is little inefficiency in the matching market setting we described.
The proof is based on a “bluffing” technique. Bluffing here corresponds to a player with value vector
vi following a strategy as if he/she had a different valuation v
′
i till a certain point in the auction. Such
bluffing is useful, as it allows the player to use the equilibrium properties to predict prices so far,
and possibly allows to take items cheaply from a different branch of the computation. Specifically,
suppose that a player sets his mind on getting some item j. Then he can try to get that item by
pretending to be some other type in all auctions previous to item j. This way he has the option to
reach item j along several different equilibrium paths and for some of it the price on item j might
be small enough that it would be better for player i to take it. However, equilibrium conditions
state that none of these paths are preferable and in particular taking expectation over all such
possible paths is not preferable. This bluffing is essential in the proof mainly because the bidding
behavior of each player depends on the history of play and subsequently on the whole valuation
vector. Thus the maximum other bid that a player faces at each auction is an implicit function
of his own valuation. Such an effect didn’t arise in simultaneous item auctions with independent
bidders.
We first state the theorem in the simplest context of auctioning one item each step, then we
show that the theorem extends to more general settings.
Theorem 3.1 The Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy of a Sequential First Price Auction with unit-
demand bidders is at most 2 e
e−1 ≈ 3.16, that is, the expected social welfare in the Sequential First
Price Auction is at least a 1/3.16 fraction of the social value of the efficient allocation.
Proof : Consider an instantiation of players values v. LetOptv be an efficient matching allocation
for the instance v and j∗i (v) be the item that player i is matched to. So the allocation is maximizing∑
i vij∗i (v). For simplicity of presentation, we will assume a pure equilibrium, that is, assume that
play is a deterministic function of the type of the player and the history so far. The result naturally
extends to mixed equilibria as well.
Also let ji(v) be the maximum value item that player i gets at the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Spe. We will also denote with USpe, SWSpe and RSpe the expected player utility, social welfare and
revenue respectively at Spe. In addition let SWOpt denote the expected optimal social welfare.
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To bound the price of anarchy, we will consider deviations for each player i. If they have a
deviation that creates high utility for them, they must have this much utility also in the equilibrium
outcome. In the full information setting [21] use a deviation where buyer i attempts to get j∗i (v).
This is not an option in the Bayesian setting, since j∗i (v) depends on the valuation of all the players,
and hence it is not known to i. We consider the following randomized version b′i of the deviation
for player i: he draws a random sample of a valuation profile w (including his own type), identifies
j∗i (vi, w−i), and the goal of the deviation will be to get this item cheaply. To do this, the player i
will “bluff” and play as in the Spe had he been of type wi up until item j = j
∗
i (vi, w−i). Then he
submits a randomized bid t that follows the density function f(t) = 1
vij−t
with support [0, (1− 1
e
)vij].
Let p−ij (v) = maxk 6=i bkj(vk, hj(v)), where hj(v) is the history of play at Spe up until item j
when players have type v. Denote with b′i(w, t) the instantiation of the above mixed deviation for
some random sample w and a random bid sample t.
If p−ij (wi, v−i) < t then player i’s utility from the deviation is at least vij − t − P−ij (wi, v−i).
Therefore for a fixed random sample w player i’s expected utility is at least
∫ (1− 1
e
)vij
p−ij (wi,v−i)
(vij − t)f(t)dt− P−ij (wi, v−i) = (1−
1
e
)vij − p−ij (wi, v−i)− P−ij (wi, v−i)
Observe in this formula that we used p−ij (wi, v−i) instead of p
−i
j (vi, v−i). This is because player
i pretended to be of type wi and hence the history that the rest of the players see up until item j
is as if player i had type wi. Moreover, for an arbitrary type profile v, p
−i
j (v) depends on vi only
through the history up until item j.
From the above reasoning we get:
Et[ui(b
′
i(w, t), b−i(v−i)) ≥ (1−
1
e
)vij − p−ij (wi, v−i)− P−ij (wi, v−i)
≥ (1− 1
e
)vij − p−ij (wi, v−i)− Pi(wi, v−i)
where Pi(v) is the total price that player i pays at Spe when the valuation profile is v.
Now taking expectation over all possible random samples, we can lower bound player i’s expected
utility from deviating to b′i:
ui(b
′
i, b−i(v−i)) = EwEt[ui(b
′
i(w, t), b−i(v−i))]
≥ Ew
[
(1− 1
e
)vij∗i (vi,w−i) − p
−i
j∗
i
(vi,w−i)
(wi, v−i)− Pi(wi, v−i)
]
By the equilibrium condition we have:
ui(vi) ≥ Ev−i [ui(b′i, b−i(v−i))]
≥ Ev−iEw
[
(1− 1
e
)vij∗i (vi,w−i) − p
−i
j∗i (vi,w−i)
(wi, v−i)− Pi(wi, v−i)
]
We work separately for each part on the right hand side:
Ev−iEw
[
vij∗i (vi,w−i)
]
= Ev−iEwiEw−i
[
vij∗i (vi,w−i)
]
= Ew−i
[
vij∗i (vi,w−i)
]
= Ev−i
[
vij∗i (v)
]
where we used that w−i is independent of wi for the Ewi to be dropped, and the last equation on
the first line is just a change of variables.
Ev−iEw [Pi(wi, v−i)] = Ev−iEwiEw−i [Pi(wi, v−i)] = Ev−iEwi [Pi(wi, v−i)] = Ev [Pi(v)]
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For the last term we will need a notation for the price of an item at some valuation pro-
file: pj(v) = maxk bkj(vk, hj(v)). Obviously for any instance v and for any player i: p
−i
j (v) =
maxk 6=i bkj(vk, hj(v)) ≤ maxk bkj(vk, hj(v)) = pj(v).
Ev−iEw
[
p−i
j∗i (vi,w−i)
(wi, v−i)
]
= Ev−iEwiEw−i
[
p−i
j∗i (vi,w−i)
(wi, v−i)
]
= Ew−iEwiEv−i
[
p−i
j∗i (vi,v−i)
(wi, w−i)
]
= Ev−iEw
[
p−i
j∗
i
(v)(w)
]
≤ Ev−iEw
[
pj∗i (v)(w)
]
Where the second line is just a convenient change of variable names. In the third equation we used
independence so as to be able to consider (wi, v−i) as a random sample w of a valuation vector.
We point out that the bluffing technique is essential in this latter computation since otherwise
we would end up with a term of the form: Ev−iEw−i
[
p−i
j∗i (vi,w−i)
(vi, v−i)
]
. This would lead to a
term Ev−iEw
[
pj∗i (vi,w−i)(v)
]
which when taking expectation over vi and summing among all players
would not correspond to the expected revenue at equilibrium. The fact that the players valuation
affects both the history of play and the index of the item that he is aiming at creates a problem.
The bluffing technique un-correlates this dependence since now the players value doesn’t affect the
history of play, but rather a random sample of his value does.
Combining the three latter equations we proved that:
ui(vi) ≥ Ev−i
[
(1− 1
e
)vij∗i (v)
]
− Ev−iEw
[
pj∗i (v)(w)
]
− Ev [Pi(v)] (3)
Taking expectation over vi for each player and adding for all players i we get:
USpe =
∑
i
ui ≥
∑
i
Ev
[
(1− 1
e
)vij∗i (v)
]
− EvEw
[
pj∗i (v)(w)
]
− Ev [Pi(v)]
=(1− 1
e
)SWOpt − EvEw

∑
j∈[m]
pj(w)

 −RSpe
=
SWOpt
2
−RSpe −RSpe
where the second line follows as the sum over elements pj∗i (v)(w) is the sum over all elements pj(v)(w)
as the optimal assignment only effects the order of summation. By rearranging, we get:
SWSpe ≥ (1− 1
e
)SWOpt −RSpe ≥ (1− 1
e
)SWOpt − SWSpe =⇒ SWSpe ≥ 1
2
(1− 1
e
)SWOpt
It is easy to generalize the latter proof to the case of mixed Bayes-Nash Equilibria, games where
groups of items are sold simultaneously. Note that the bound of 3.16 of this result is an improvement
over the bound of 4 for mixed Nash Equilibria of [21] even in the full information setting.
Corollary 3.2 The mixed Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy of a Sequential First Price Auction where
at each stage a set of items are on sale simultaneously and bidders are unit-demand is at most 3.16.
Further, we can generalize the above theorems to approximately unit-demand environments in
the following sense: given any instance of values v, the optimal matching allocation OptM is at
least 1/γ the optimal allocation Opt. Then the latter two theorems carry over with a blow-up of
γ.
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4 Matroid Auctions
In this section we consider a setting when N players each would like to get a service. However,
due the constraints of the service only a subset of them can be selected. We will assume that the
constraints have a matroid structure. Suppose there is a set of N bidders and there is a matroid
M = (N,I), where the independent sets are sets that can be simultaneously served. Suppose each
player i has a value vi for getting the service. We assume that the valuation profile v of the bidders
is drawn from a possibly correlated distribution F that is common knowledge. The goal of the
mechanism is to find an independent set I of high value
∑
i∈I vi to serve.
The simple auction format will be based on the natural greedy algorithm for finding a large
value independent set. A maximum value independent set is naturally a maximal independent set,
a basis B of the matroid. A cut of a matroid is a set S ⊂ N that intersects all bases. For example,
in the matroid of a graph, where an edge-set is independent if it contain no cycles, basis are the
spanning trees, and cuts are the set of edges crossing a graph cut.
We consider the following class of simple sequential first-price auctions: At each time step the
auctioneer picks a cut of the matroid that doesn’t intersect previous winners and runs a first price
sealed-bid auction among the bidders in the cut. At the end of each auction j the winner wj and the
price that he paid pj are announced. Such an auction defines an extensive form game of incomplete
information. If in each auctions bidders would announce their true value vi as bids, the auction
corresponds to the standard greedy algorithm for matroids, and would result in picking the basis
of maximum value. For many matroid structures cuts can be small, and hence the auction lends
itself to a more distributed implementation, when only elements of a cut have to participate in
one auction. The sequential structure of the auction allows participants to infer information about
other players, and leads to strategies that possibly will not lead to an efficient outcome.
4.1 Inefficiency of the Incomplete Case
In [21] we studied the complete information version of this matroid auction game and showed that
it implements the Vcg outcome in the sense that all equilibria select an efficient outcome, and
make all winners pay their Vcg price.
However, when we move to the incomplete information setting the auction no longer implements
the Vcg outcome, and inefficiency could arise at the sequential equilibria of the game.
As an example, consider the matroid on three players, where any two are independent, but not
all three. This is the graphical matroid of a triangle graph. Suppose that all players valuations are
drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 1). If we use the cut {a, b} as the first cut, then in the
next auction, the loser of the first auction is bidding against the 3rd player c. This is exactly the
example of Lemma 2.2 cast as a matroid auction: players a and b participate in the first auction,
and then c plays against the loser. As we showed the result is not guaranteed to be efficient.
4.2 Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy
We first present a lemma from [21] that will be very useful in our main theorem. We define the
notion of the participation graph P(B) of a base B to be a bipartite graph between the elements
in the base and the auctions that took place. An edge exists between an element of the base and
an auction if that element participated in the auction.
Lemma 4.1 ([21]) For any base B of the matroid M, P(B) contains a perfect matching.
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Theorem 4.2 The Bayes-Nash Price of anarchy of the Sequential First Price Cut Auction is at
most 1 + e
e−1 ≈ 2.58 even if valuations are arbitrarily correlated.
Proof : Given an instantiation of the value vector v, let Opt(v) be the optimal base under value
vector v and Spe(v) the base produced at a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. From Lemma 4.1 we have
that for any instantiation of values v there is a perfect matching between the auctions that take
place and the players in Opt(v). For a player i ∈ Opt(v) let Av(i) be the index of the auction that
player i is matched with in the latter matching. Also let xi(v) = 1i∈Spe(v) and yi(v) = 1i∈Opt(v).
Consider an instance of players’ values v and a player i ∈ Opt(v)−Spe(v). Suppose that i bids
according to the following randomized strategy b′i: he picks a random bid t with density f(t) =
1
vi−t
and support [0, (1 − 1
e
)vi] and then bids t in all the auctions until he either gets allocated or
the auctions finish. Since i /∈ Spe(v) every time that he loses an auction j he doesn’t affect the
outcome (wj , pj) that is announced and therefore the change is transparent to the rest of the players.
Hence, they continue using their equilibrium strategies in the subsequent auctions and the prices at
subsequent auctions are the same as before the deviation. Let b′i(t) be the deterministic deviation
for some instance of the random bid t.
If pAv(i) < t then player i will definitely win some auction in the deviation b
′
i(t) and his utility
will be vi − t. An important point for the above to hold is that as long as a player is not winning
then, since by assumption he wasn’t winning previously too, he doesn’t change the history of play
since the same price and winner announcement is made after each auction. Hence, when Av(i)
arrives, either player i has already won an item or the price of Av(i) is going to be the equilibrium
price pAv(i) of that item. Thus player i’s expected utility from the deviation is at least:
ui(b
′
i, b−i(v−i)) ≥ yi(v)
∫ (1− 1
e
)vi
pAv(i)
(vi − t)f(t)dt = (1− 1
e
)viyi(v)− pAv(i)yi(v) (4)
If i ∈ Opt(v) ∩ Spe(v), i.e. xi(v) = 1, then we cannot consider the latter deviation since i is
winning at some auction at equilibrium and by switching he will definitely change either the winner
or the price of that auction. Therefore the deviation is not transparent to the rest of the players.
However, the following inequality, that is trivially true when xi(v) = 1, will be sufficient to give us
the desired bound.
(1− 1
e
)vixi(v) ≥ (1− 1
e
)viyi(v) (5)
Combining the last two inequalities we get that for all i ∈ Opt(v):
ui(b
′
i, b−i(v−i)) ≥ (1−
1
e
)viyi(v)− pAv(i)yi(v)− (1−
1
e
)vixi(v) (6)
For i /∈ Opt(v) the above inequality trivially holds since the right hand side is non-positive and
the utility from the deviation can only be non-negative.
From the equilibrium condition we have:
Ev−i|vi [ui(bi(vi), b−i(v−i))] ≥ Ev−i|vi [(1−
1
e
)viyi(v)− pAv(i)(v)yi(v) − (1 −
1
e
)vixi(v)] (7)
Taking expectation over vi, adding for all i and using the fact that Av(i) is a matching between
players in Opt(v) and auctions that took place (and therefore winners of those auctions), we get:
Ev[
∑
i
ui(b(v))] ≥Ev[(1− 1
e
)
∑
i∈Opt(v)
vi −
∑
i∈Opt(v)
pAv(i)(v) − (1−
1
e
)
∑
i∈Spe(v)
vi]
=(1− 1
e
)SWOpt − Ev[
∑
i∈Spe(v)
pi(v)]− (1− 1
e
)SWSpe
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Rearranging we get:
Ev[
∑
i∈Spe(v)
ui(b(v)) + pi(v)] + (1− 1
e
)SWSpe ≥ (1− 1
e
)SWOpt =⇒
SWSpe + (1− 1
e
)SWSpe ≥ (1− 1
e
)SWOpt =⇒ (1 + e
e− 1)SWSpe ≥ SWOpt
4.3 Single Value Matching Markets
In this part we consider a special case of our matching market setting where each player has a single
private value vi but participates in a subset of auctions Si. The set of auctions where each player
participates is common knowledge but the value is private. We call such a setting a Single Value
Matching Market. For this special case of matching markets we show that the bound of 1+ e
e−1 on
the price of anarchy extends even when the values of the bidders are arbitrarily correlated and not
independent.
In terms of an auction setting the latter is a special case of a matroid setting where the matroid
is the matchable set of nodes on the one side of a bipartite graph: Let G be a bipartite graph with
two sides A and B. This graph gives rise to a matroid on A, where a subset S ⊂ A is independent
if there is a matching of G that matches all nodes in A. We can think of the nodes of B as service
stations and A are the players who want to connect to some station. This example can be thought
of both as a matroid auction, but it is also a special case of a matching auction where the graph
represents which items can be assigned to each player, and all players value all items that they
can get identically. It is interesting to note the difference between the sequential cut auction when
applied to this matroid and the sequential item auction. The matching auction, runs auctions
selling off each element B individually, and greedily assigns the element auctioned to the winner.
(With identical valuations winners will not bid on future items). In contrast the cut auction greedily
commits to serve the winner w, but does not commit to which node in B to assign it to. We can
think of the mechanism as maintaining a tentative matching.
Therefore, if we want to claim a bound on the sequential item auction for this setting we cannot
simply apply the bound of the sequential cut auction from the previous section. However, using a
very similar proof with the same type of deviation (bid vi/2 at all the item-auctions you participate
in until you get allocated) leads to a proof for the item auction too. Moreover, such a proof holds
for correlated bidders.
Theorem 4.3 The Bayes-Nash Price of anarchy of the Sequential First Price Item Auction in a
single-value matching market is at most 1 + e
e−1 ≈ 2.58 even if the values of the different players
are arbitrarily correlated.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 2.1
In this section we present in detail the equilibrium computation of the sequential item auction
example of two items 1 and 2 and three bidders a, b, c.
Consider the first auction. Since at that point both players face a symmetric setting, it is natural
to look at equilibria where a, b bid symmetrically in the first auction. Thus suppose that at the first
auction both a and b bid according to some strategy monotone b(v). Based on such a symmetric
play in the first auction, we will work out analytically the equilibrium and utilities in the second
auction, and then solve the resulting differential equation that equilibrium in the first auction has
to satisfy.
In the second auction, player c is playing with the loser of the first auction. Without loss of
generality assume this is player a. From the fact that player a lost the first auction and the bidders
use monotone strategies, it becomes common knowledge that a has a value less than b−1(p1), where
p1 is the winning price of the first cut auction. Thus the auction for the second item is a first price
auction with asymmetric bidders: player a is uniformly distributed in [0, b−1(p1)] and player c is
uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. The latter is a well known setting and the bidding strategies can be
analytically computed (see e.g. [15]):
ba(va) =
1
kva
(1−
√
1− kv2a) =
va
1 +
√
1− kv2a
bc(vc) =
1
kvc
(
√
1 + kv2c − 1) =
vc
1 +
√
1 + kv2c
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where k = 1(b−1(p1))2 − 1 ≥ 0. Observe that if the ”weak” player a has value va then for the strong
player to win he must have value vc ≥ b−1c (ba(va)) = va√1−kv2a ≥ va. Hence, the allocation in this
auction will not be efficient.
This bidding strategies allow us to explicitly compute player’s a expected utility from the last
auction given his value va, and given the price the first auction was won at. (Note that in the first
auction player a has different utility for each possible price outcome even when he looses.) Let
u2a(va, p1) denote player a’s expected utility from the last auction given his value va, and a price
announcement of p1 in the first auction won by player b.
u2a(va, p1) =Fc(b
−1
c (ba(va)))(va − ba(va)) = b−1c (ba(va))(va − ba(va))
=
va√
1− kv2a
(va − ba(va)) = v
2
a
1 +
√
1− kv2a
Since we assume a symmetric strategy in the first auction, the expected utility of player a in
the first auction if he makes a bid as if he has value x is:
u1a(x) = Fb(x)(va − b(x)) + (1− Fb(x))Evb|vb>x[u2a(va, b(vb))]
= x(va − b(x)) +
∫ 1
x
u2a(va, b(t))dt
The first part on the right hand side is the utility of the player from winning the auction and the
second part is the utility of the player when he loses.
For b(x) to be an equilibrium it has to be that the latter utility is maximized at va. Thus taking
the first order conditions gives us:
∂u1a(x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=va
= 0⇔ va − b(va)− vab′(va)− u2a(va, b(va)) = 0
We also impose the boundary condition that a player with zero value will bid zero b(0) = 0. It
may be useful to observe that without the final part of u2a(va, b(va)) the last first order differential
equation gives as a unique solution the well known first price equilibrium for uniformly distributed
bidders of b(va) = va/2. In our case the latter part was introduced due to the externality introduced
by the subsequent auction and the fact that the utility in the subsequent auction depends on price
at the current one. The solution of the above differential equation gives us the equilibrium with
the second auction.
Now, we analytically compute the equilibrium function at the first auction. First we observe
that for p1 = b(va) we have: k =
1
(b−1(b(va)))2
− 1 = 1
v2a
− 1. Hence:
u2a(va, b(va)) =
v2a
1 + va
Thus the differential equation for the first auction becomes:
va − b(va)− vab′(va)− v
2
a
1 + va
= 0
This has a unique solution of b(v) = 1− ln(1+v)
v
. So far we assumed a and b in the first auction bid
in the range of [0, b−1(1)] possibly pretending to have a different value, but never bidding outside
this range (above b−1(1)], and that beliefs after he first auction about the loser are updated to a
uniform distribution on [0, b−1(p)].
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To complete the equilibrium computation we need to show that this equilibrium arises as a
limit of equilibria where players bit uniformly random U(0, 1) with a small probability ǫ and bid
according to the equilibrium b(x) with the remaining. For such strategies the Bayesian update of
beliefs is well defined for any possible bid. In the equilibrium, the updated beliefs have to be limits
of such Bayesian updates as ǫ goes to 0. For a price announcement in the range of b(x) this updates
are the classic updates we defined above. For a price announcement above the range of b(x) there
two cases: either the loser bid noisily and lost in which case there is no information revealed or he
bid according to the equilibrium and lost in which case again no information is leaked about his
value. Thus the updated belief for any ǫ will be U(0, 1) for the loser. Thus the limit will also be
U(0, 1). So for price announcements that are not predicted by the equilibrium function the updated
beliefs are as if there was a price announcement of b(1). The latter detail completes the Sequential
Equilibrium computation.
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